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Generals, diplomats, and lovers have used cryptography for thousands of years to encode
messages and other documents so that only the intended recipient would be able to read
them. Julius Caesar, for example, is reported to have used a substitution encryption scheme
or cipher to exchange messages with his generals. Each letter in an original message was
substituted with another letter obtained by shifting a fixed number of letters further along in
the alphabet. So, a would be replaced by, say, c; b would become d; and so on. The codes of
such simple substitution ciphers are easily broken by noting the frequencies of the letters in
the encoded messages. In English words, for example, the letter e occurs most often – it is
56 times more common than q, the least common letter. And more English words begin with
the letter s than with any other letter. So over the years, cryptologists have devised ever
more sophisticated and complex encryption schemes to provide greater security to encoded
information. 
In this month’s column, Logan Scott and Dorothy Denning discuss an innovative encryption
scheme that integrates position and time into the encryption and decryption processes. Their
geo-encryption approach builds on established cryptographic algorithms and protocols in a
way that provides an additional layer of security beyond that provided by conventional cryp-
tography. It allows data to be encrypted for one or more specific locations or areas such as a
corporation’s campus area. Constraints in time as well as location can also be enforced. Geo-
encryption can be used with both fixed and mobile applications and supports a wide range of
data sharing and distribution policies such as providing location-based security for digital cin-
ema distribution and forensic analysis in cases of piracy. For the military GPS user, the authors
illustrate how individual waypoints can be uniquely encrypted so as to be accessible only
when the receiver is physically within the route parameters, both in terms of location and
time. — R.B.L.
Innovation
Using GPS to Enhance Data Security
Geo-Encryption
Logan Scott and Dorothy E. Denning
On September 17, 2000, QualcommCEO and Chairman Irwin Jacob’s
IBM Thinkpad computer was stolen 
while he stood a few meters from it. He
“was startled to find his laptop missing
from the podium after he wrapped up
questions from the Society of American
Business Editors and Writers in Irvine,
California” (Forbes Magazine). Fortunately,
his hard drive was password protected.
“At one of the largest technology com-
panies where policy required that pass-
words exceed eight characters, mix cases,
and include numbers or symbols ... [the
program] L0phtCrack obtained 18 per-
cent of the passwords in 10 minutes.
Ninety percent of the passwords were
recovered within 48 hours on a Pentium
II/300. The Administrator and most
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Domain Admin passwords were cracked”
(@stake Web site advertising their LC4
password audit and recovery product).
Government personnel should know
better. However, that is not always the
case: “The Pentagon is investigating
whether ultrasecret ‘black programs’
were compromised by former CIA Director
John Deutch after he put details about
some of the Defense Department’s most
sensitive activities on his home com-
puters” (Washington Times, February 17,
2000).
People tend to be the weakest link in
security. On the subject of computer secu-
rity, security technologist and author
Bruce Schneier comments that “the mathe-
matics are impeccable, the computers
are vincible, the networks are lousy, and
the people are abysmal” (Secrets and Lies:
Digital Security in a Networked World).
Network and computer security is
rarely breeched using a brute-force attack
against cryptographic elements because
the algorithms are simply too strong.
Instead, attackers rely on myriad tech-
niques that take advantage of operating
systems features, and they attack pro-
tocols, use insider access, exploit human
weaknesses, or obtain information through
social engineering. 
Geo-Encryption
Geo-encryption builds on established
cryptographic algorithms and protocols
in a way that provides an additional layer
of security beyond that provided by con-
ventional cryptography. It allows data to
be encrypted for a specific place or broad
geographic area and supports constraints
in time as well as space. It can be used
with both fixed and mobile applications
and supports a range of data sharing and
distribution policies. It provides full pro-
tection against attempts to bypass the
location feature. Depending on the imple-
mentation, it can also provide strong pro-
tection against location spoofing.
The terms location-based encryption
or geo-encryption are used in this arti-
cle to refer to any method of encryption
in which the encrypted information,
called ciphertext, can be decrypted only
at a specified location. If someone
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attempts to decrypt the
data at another location,
the decryption process
fails and reveals no details about the
original plaintext information. The device
performing the decryption determines
its location using some sort of loca-
tion sensor such as a GPS receiver or
other satellite or radio frequency posi-
tioning system.
Location-based encryption can be 
used to ensure that data cannot be decrypt-
ed outside a particular facility — for
example, the headquarters of a gov-
ernment agency or corporation or an
individual’s office or home. Alternatively,
it may be used to confine access to a
broad geographic region. Time as well
as space constraints can be placed on
the decryption location.
Encryption Algorithms. Broadly speak-
ing, encryption algorithms or ciphers
can be divided into two categories: sym-
metric algorithms and asymmetric algo-
rithms. As shown in Figure 1, symmetric
algorithms use the same key (i.e., a spe-
cific digital code or bit pattern used with
the algorithm) for encrypting (i.e., lock-
ing) plaintext and decrypting (i.e., unlock-
ing) ciphertext. Numerous, very fast sym-
metric algorithms are in widespread use,
including the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) and Triple-DES and the newly
released Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES). Keeping the key private is essen-
tial to maintaining security. Therein lies
the crucial question: How should keys be
shared securely? Several techniques have
been developed; the interested reader
is directed to the “Further Reading” side-
bar for more information.
Asymmetric algorithms are compara-
tively new on the scene — the first descrip-
tion was published in 1976. Also known
as public-key algorithms, these algorithms
have distinct keys for encryption and
decryption as is shown in
Figure 2. Here, Key_E can
be used to encrypt the
plaintext but not to decrypt
the ciphertext. A separate
key, Key_D, is needed to
perform this function. In
principle, to securely con-
vey the plaintext, the
intended recipient could
generate a key pair
(Key_E, Key_D) and send
Key_E, the public key, to
the originator by means
of unsecured channels.
This action would allow
the originator — or any-
one else — to encrypt
plaintext for transmittal
to the recipient who uses Key_D, the pri-
vate key, to decrypt the ciphertext. RSA,
named after its creators Rivest, Shamir,
and Adleman, is perhaps the most pop-
ular asymmetric algorithm in use today.
Its security is based on the difficulty of
factoring large prime numbers.
One major drawback to asymmetric
algorithms is that their computational
speed is typically orders of magnitude
(1,000) slower than are comparable
symmetric algorithms.
This problem led to the
notion of hybrid algo-
rithms such as the one
shown in Figure 3. Here, a
random key, sometimes
called the session key, is
generated by the origi-
nator and sent to the recip-
ient using an asymmet-
ric algorithm. This session
key is then used by both
parties to communicate
securely using a much
faster symmetric algorithm.
The hybrid approach has
found wide application,
most notably on the
Internet where it forms the
basis for secure browsers
(e.g., Secure Socket Layer)
and secure e-mail.
The Geo-Encryption Algorithm. In prin-
ciple, one could cryptographically bind
or attach a set of location and time speci-
fications to the ciphertext file and build
devices that would decrypt the file only
when the user is within the specified
location and time constraints. However,
this approach presents potential prob-
lems: The resultant file reveals the physi-
cal location of the intended recipient.
The military frowns on this sort of thing,
at least for their own forces. Furthermore,
it provides vital information to some-
one who wants to spoof the device.
If the device is vulnerable to tam-
pering, it may be possible to modify it to
completely bypass the location check.
The modified device would decrypt all
received data without acquiring its loca-
tion and verifying that it is correct.
Alternatively, an adversary might com-
promise the keys and build a modified
decryption device without the location
check. Either way, the modified device
could be used anywhere, and location
would be irrelevant.
As another possibility, one could use
location itself as the cryptographic key
to an otherwise strong encryption algo-
rithm such as AES. This is ill advised in
that location is unlikely to have sufficient
entropy (i.e., uncertainty) to provide
strong protection. Even if an adver-
sary does not know the precise location,
enough information may be available to
enable a rapid brute-force attack analo-
gous to a dictionary attack. For exam-
ple, suppose that location is coded as
a latitude–longitude pair at the precision
of one centimeter and that an adversary
is able to narrow the latitude and lon-
gitude to within a kilometer. Then there
are only 100,000 possible values each for
latitude and for longitude, or 10 bil-
lion possible pairs (i.e., keys). Testing
each of these pairs would be easy.
Applying an obfuscation function to
the location value before using it as a key
could strengthen this approach; how-
ever, the function would have to be kept
FIGURE 2 Asymmetric or two-
key algorithms use one key for
encrypting the plaintext and
another key for decrypting the
ciphertext. Also known as pub-
lic-key algorithms, a public
key, Key_E, is used for encryp-
tion and a distinct private key,








FIGURE 3 In hybrid encryption algorithms, a randomly
generated key is used to symmetrically encrypt and
decrypt a message, file, or data stream, and the key itself
is encrypted using a public-key algorithm. Such a proce-
dure is more efficient than using the two-key approach to
















FIGURE 1 Symmetric or single-
key algorithms use the same
key to encrypt the plaintext
and to decrypt the ciphertext.
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secret to prevent the adversary from doing
the same. In general, security by obscu-
rity is scoffed at because once the secret
method is exposed, it becomes useless.
The entire security system collapses like
a house of cards. 
A guiding principle behind the devel-
opment of cryptographic systems is that
security should not depend on keeping
the algorithms secret, only the keys. This
does not mean that the algorithms must
be made public, but that they be designed
to withstand attack under the assump-
tion that the adversary knows them.
Security is then achieved by encoding
the secrets in the keys, designing the algo-
rithm so that the best attack requires an
exhaustive search of the key space, and
using sufficiently long keys that exhaus-
tive search is infeasible.
Grid spacing must take into account
the accuracy of the GPS receiver at the
decrypting site, otherwise erroneous
GeoLock values may result. It makes no
sense to have one-centimeter grid spac-
ing if a standalone GPS receiver is being
used. Conversely, if one is using an RTK-
style receiver capable of two-centimeter
accuracy, 10-meter grid spacing is over-
ly conservative. Grid spacing may also
be wider in the vertical direction to account
for poorer vertical positioning accuracy
typical in most sets because of satellite
geometries. Figure 6 shows the number
of possible grid points on the planet as
a function of grid spacing, ignoring alti-
tude, time, and velocity. 
A more complete PVT-to-GeoLock
mapping function could actually have
eight inputs:
 position (east, north, up compo-
nents)
 velocity (east, north, up components)
 time
 coordinate system parameters.
The velocity inputs might actually map
into a minimum speed requirement to
ensure that the recipient is actually under
way. Including coordinate system para-
meters in the PVT-to-GeoLock mapping
function provides support for nonsta-
tionary reference frames. This feature
might be used, for example, in com-
municating with a satellite.
The grid could just as well be based
on the Military Grid Reference System
or its close cousin, the Universal Transverse
Mercator system. In fact, instead of a
point, an area with any arbitrary shape
could have been used. For example,
the shape of the Disneyland theme park
could map to a single GeoLock value
to permit successful decryption when
the user is located in the theme park but
not when outside.
Finally, the PVT-to-GeoLock mapping
function itself may incorporate a hash
function — a one-way encryption func-
tion (which cannot be reversed) — with
cryptographic aspects to hinder using
the GeoLock to obtain PVT block values.
Similarly, the algorithm may be delib-
erately slow and difficult, perhaps based
on solving a difficult problem.
Antispoof Receivers. Most civil or non-
military GPS receivers are trivially easy
to spoof or fool into determining erro-
neous positions: Simply hook up one of
the many excellent signal simulators
available, and the receiver will buy into
whatever PVT values you want. This char-
acteristic is why military receivers use
GeoCodex’s geo-encryption algorithm
addresses these issues by building on
established security algorithms and pro-
tocols. As shown in Figure 4, our approach
modifies the previously discussed hybrid
algorithm to include a “GeoLock.”
On the originating (i.e., encrypting)
side, a GeoLock is computed on the basis
of the intended recipient’s position, veloc-
ity, and time (PVT) block. The PVT block
defines where the recipient must be in
terms of position, velocity, and time
for decryption to be successful. The
GeoLock is then added bit by bit — an
exclusive or (XOR) logical operation —
with the session key (i.e., Key_S) to form
a GeoLocked session key. The result is
then encrypted using an asymmetric algo-
rithm and conveyed to the recipient,
much like that in the hybrid algorithm
of Figure 3. On the recipient (i.e., decryp-
tion) side, GeoLocks are computed using
a spoof-resistant GPS receiver for PVT
input into the PVT-to-GeoLock mapping
function. If the PVT values are correct,
then the resultant GeoLock will XOR
with the GeoLocked key to provide the
correct session key (i.e., Key_S).
PVT-to-GeoLock Mapping Function.
Sidestepping for now the question of
what constitutes an antispoof receiver,
we will address how GeoLocks are formed.
Figure 5 shows a notional diagram of a
PVT-to-GeoLock mapping function in
which latitude, longitude, and time con-
stitute the inputs. Here, a regular grid of
latitude, longitude, and time values
has been created, each with an associ-
ated GeoLock value.
FIGURE 4 A geo-encryption algorithm uses a GPS receiver to decrypt a key that has
been encrypted with position, velocity, and time values. If successfully recovered, the

























FIGURE 5 Our geo-encryption process
uses a position-velocity-time to GeoLock
mapping function to generate a code or
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the Y-code, which is an encrypted ver-
sion of the P-code. Unless spoofers have
access to the correct cryptographic keys
and know how to generate Y-code from
P-code, they can’t spoof the military set.
They may be able to jam it, but not spoof
it. 
Civil sets can be made difficult to spoof
through a series of hardening measures.
These include a variety of signals checks:
 Use a jamming-to-noise power ratio
(J/N) meter to check for above-normal
energy levels.
 Monitor carrier-to-noise-density
ratio (C/N0) for consistency or unexpected
C/N0 given J/N.
 Monitor the phase difference between
antenna elements (all signals shouldn’t
come from the same direction).
 Use “deep acquisition” to look for
to follow a specific geographical path
before they can be decrypted. This strat-
egy is achieved by applying multiple Geo-
Locks at the origination node prior to
transmittal using a procedure such as
the one shown in Figure 7. As each required
node is traversed, one layer of GeoLocking
is removed, thus ensuring the desired
path has been followed.
Relay encryption might be useful
for applications that use regional dis-
tribution centers for the distribution
of data supplied by producers. For exam-
ple, in subscription television the pro-
ducers could be the television networks,
and the distributors are cable or satel-
lite television providers. A producer could
first lock a key to a geographic region
covered by one of the distributors using
a key known only to the subscribers and
then to the precise location of the dis-
tributor using the distributor’s key. The
distributor would unlock its GeoLock
before broadcasting the programming
to subscribers, who would then unlock
the regional GeoLock and decrypt the
ciphertext.
In some applications, it may be desir-
able to know that a message has followed
a particular route. Figure 8 depicts a process
similar to the route-forcing technique in
which each traversed node in effect stamps
the message with its PVT values.
Applications
To show how geo-encryption can be
applied to real-world problems, we pre-
sent two examples: digital cinema dis-
tribution and GPS receiver waypoint geo-
encryption.
Digital Cinema Distribution. “Today, film
studios spend over $1 billion each year to
duplicate, distribute, rejuvenate, redis-
tribute, and ultimately destroy the thou-
sands of film reels required to bring the
close to 500 films released each year to
audiences across the U.S.,” management
consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton
reports in Digital Cinema: Breaking the
Logjam. Although satellite-communica-
tions (SatCom) links provide a very effi-
cient and cost-effective digital cinema dis-
tribution alternative, piracy is a major
concern. SatCom links are easy to inter-
cept. Direct Satellite Services satellite-to-
home broadcasting is a good example. An
estimated three million unauthorized users
are reaping benefits from cloned versions
of the tamper resistant smart cards that
seek to prevent piracy. Furthermore, cin-
ema stakeholders are risk adverse toward
piracy on the basis of the music industry’s
weak, real signals.
Numerous navigation checks can also
be instituted:
 Compare “watch time” with “sig-
nals time” (most signal generators can’t
synchronize with GPS time).
 Conduct continuity checks in time
and position.
 Conduct consistency checks with
other navigation sensors.
 Check for large residual errors, par-
ticularly in differential correction chan-
nel(s).
 Use receiver-autonomous integri-
ty monitoring (RAIM)–type functions.
With careful attention to detail, civil sets
do not have to be as vulnerable to spoof-
ing as most of them are.
Relay Encryption. Successive geo-encryp-
tion can be used to force data and/or keys
FIGURE 6 The number of distinct grid locations covering the earth’s surface depends






































































That is used with restrictive
clauses, as I see “use regional
distribution centers...” to be (the
sentence wouldn’t mean the
same without it).
When earth is preceded by
“the,” no cap on earth.
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experience with “Napsterization.” Music
sales are down 8 percent, and company
valuations are down 40 percent, largely
because of piracy. 
As a consequence, the cinema indus-
try has shown significant interest in pro-
viding location-based security for digi-
tal cinema distribution and forensic
analysis in cases of piracy. GeoCodex has
been working with Digital Cinema
Ventures to develop security techniques
specific to this industry.
In this application, the same large (i.e.,
25 to 190 gigabytes) encrypted media file
might be used at multiple theater loca-
tions nationwide but would have distinct
GeoLocked keys specific to the intend-
ed recipient location and its exhibition
license. This approach provides a secure
and efficient point-to-multipoint distribu-
tion model applicable to distributions by
means of satellite or DVD (formerly known
as Digital Video/Versatile Disk). At the exhi-
bition hall, robust watermarking/stegano-
then provides the still-encrypted media
file to an authorized, tamper-resistant
projector that contains sufficient buffer-
ing to source the real-time decryption
and exhibition of the media file.
Placing four successive locks on the
random key similar to those shown in
Figure 7, the studio proxy can force
the key to traverse the distribution car-
rier’s server, which takes off its lock (U4A);
the theater server, which takes off its lock
(U3A); and finally, the projector, which
takes off its lock (U2A) and the studio’s
lock (U0A). Only the projector and the
studio proxy can access the random key
needed to decrypt the media file.
Intervening stages of distribution are
critically involved in key transmittal and
partial decryption, but they have no access
to the plaintext media.
Waypoint GeoLocking. To navigate with
GPS, users typically follow a route con-
sisting of an ordered series of waypoints.
In its simplest form, a waypoint is noth-
ing more than a position, but in airborne
applications it may contain velocity expec-
tations as well as time-of-transit expec-
tations. In military applications, veloc-
ity and time-of-transit specifications are
used for launching coordinated attacks
in which diverse force elements con-
verge on target(s) simultaneously. Ground
forces routinely use GPS to place, and
then traverse, mine fields via safe routes.
Extended waypoint/regional infor-
mation can include
 radio contact parameters
• frequency




In short, for the military user, the way-
points and associated routes are some
of the most sensitive data in the military
GPS set and should be protected accord-
ingly. Geo-encryption can provide an
additional layer of security by restrict-
ing access to waypoint data on the basis
of location, time, and velocity.
Figure 10 depicts a notional mission
profile consisting of a series of waypoints
for which we have defined regions of
access for waypoints 2 and 3. There is
no particular requirement that the PVT-
to-GeoLock mapping function be based
on a regular grid; in our example we have
chosen polygonal shapes based on mis-
sion needs. Also, note that GeoLock
regions can overlap; they do not have to
be geographically disjointed from one
another. Time and velocity window
graphic techniques can introduce loca-
tion, time, and exhibition license infor-
mation into the exhibition for subsequent
use in piracy investigations.
Figure 9 depicts a media distribution
reference model in which a studio con-
trol policy is maintained. In this model,
we start with the telecine, which pro-
duces the digital cinema (DC) master, an
uncompressed, highest-resolution digi-
tal version taken from the film masters.
The postproduction house assembles and
converts the DC master into multiple ver-
sions, possibly for presentation and exhi-
bition on a variety of media (e.g., the-
ater, DVD, cable TV). A postproduction
server then provides multiple encryp-
tions of the various versions for distri-
bution. Individual distributors are ex-
pected, but not required, to have their
own servers to source their own facili-
ties. Theaters receive copies of the media
file in non–real time and store a copy on
their local servers. The theater server
FIGURE 9 Geo-encryption can be used to enforce a studio control policy to ensure that





























































FIGURE 8 If it is important that a message follow a specific route from origin to desti-
nation, then at each node along the route, the message could be stamped with posi-
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requirements could also have been
imposed.
As an added refinement, we could also
define a “keep waypoints” region, shown
in yellow in Figure 10. If the set exits this
area, perhaps due to capture, it can destroy
its waypoints. Alternatively, it might dis-
play a different set of waypoints and
routes, possibly with misleading descrip-
tions. For example, it might display a
route titled “Safe Route Through
Minefield” that in fact leads
over the mines. The set could
also be configured to display
an erroneous position when
outside of its authorized area.
Weapons systems with inte-
grated GeoLock capability
may refuse to fire — or worse
— when outside of their autho-
rized areas. The possibili-
ties are limited only by the cre-
ativity of the mission planner.
Conclusion
Geo-encryption is an approach to loca-
tion-based encryption that builds on
established cryptographic algorithms
and protocols. It allows data to be encrypt-
ed for a specific place or broad geographic
area, and supports constraints in time
as well as in space. The system can sup-
port both fixed and mobile applications
and a variety of data-sharing and dis-
tribution policies. It provides full pro-
tection against location bypass. Depending
on individual implementations, it also
can provide strong protection against
location spoofing. 
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FIGURE 10 GPS waypoints can be geo-encrypted to
secure mission information.
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